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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Minor Parties and the Election Laws-The Socialist Petition.
On September 28, 1932, the State Board of Elections received
petitions for the placing of presidential electors of the Socialist and
Prohibition parties on the North Carolina official ballot.' It is reported
that the Socialist petition carried more than the ten thousand signatures
of legal voters required by the Board of Elections' interpretation of
the legislative definition of a political party,2 and accordingly the
Board directed that the Socialist electors be placed on the ballot with
the Republican and Democratic candidates. The Prohibition petition
had less than three hundred names. Previously the Communist party
had instituted mandamus proceedings to require the members of the
'Raleigh News and Observer, September 29, 1932.
Apparently the Board ipplied the primary definition to a general election
question. See infra.
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Board of Elections to show cause why the Communist candidates
should not be placed on the ballot without obtaining ten thousand
signatures.3 Judge N. A. Sinclair in Wake County Superior Court
denied the motion for a writ of mandamus.4
The Federal constitutional provision relating to the selection of
these electors is that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct. . ."5 thus leaving the method of
choice within the exclusive control of the legislature of each state.6
It has been said that the legislature itself might choose the electors,
or it might provide for their election by the people, their appointment
by the governor, or by any other agent it might secure.7 The extent
of the legislature's power in this field has been before the United
States Supreme Court one time, where the answer was emphatic that
the authority to direct the manner of appointment is plenary.8 What
of a legislature's enactment that the State's presidential electors shall
be chosen by the executive committee of a political party-or some
such partizan arrangement ?9 Suppose the 1927 General Assembly had
'Raleigh News and Observer, September 14, 1932.
"Raleigh News and Observer; September 17, 1932.
'Art. 2, §1, cl. 2. "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legis-
lature thereof may direct, a number of Electors, equal to the whole Number
of Senators and Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector." The
time of choosing-electors and the day on which they shall give their votes,
which shall be the same throughout the United States, is left for Congres-
sional determination. Art. 2, §1, cl. 3.
0 In the early days of the republic selection of the electors by the legisla-
tures- was common. North Carolina used this method in 1812. The same was
true of South Carolina up to 1860. The electors who cast Colorado's vote in
the Hayes-Tilden controversy were chosen by the legislature, and the vote was
unchallenged. See, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 31-32, 35, 13 Sup. Ct.
3, 36 L. ed. 869, 875-876, 877 (1892). See also, Clark, The Electoral College
and Presidential Suffrage (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 737. Chief Justice
Clark describes a variety of methods which have been utilized by the legis-
latures. He points out that in 1796 and in 1800 the legislature of Tennessee
appointed certain persons to themselves select the electors. Hawley, The Part
of the People and of the States in Choosing the President (1900) 171 NORTH
AMERICAN Rv. 273, ". . . the election of Presidents by the people is merely a
popular custom, permitted, but not ordered by the fundamental law of the
country." BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PoLITcs (1911) 179.
' Senate Rep., 1st. Sess. 43 Cong., No. 395,, quoted in McPherson v.
Blacker, supra note 6, and there approved. Indeedi the North Carolina statute
provides that in case of absence or ineligibility of any elector at the time of
voting for a president and vice-president, those electors present shall select
persons to supply the deficiency. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6012.
' McPherson v. Blacker, supra note 6. The dispute there involved the
power of the legislature to provide for selection of presidential electors in
congressional districts rather than by the people at large.
'Of course this is a moot question. It is hard to conceive of a dominant
party in a state legislature attempting it. But see, STANWOOD, HISTORY OF THE
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provided that the electors to be selected in 1928 should be chosen,
not by the people at large, but by the State Democratic Executive
Committee. Certainly their selection in 1928 would not have re-
flected the choice of the electorate in that memorable year. Absurd
perhaps, but it's difficult to point out a specific constitutional objection,
Is the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on discriminations preventive of
this appalling theoretical situation? Since a politically one-sided leg-
islature might constitutionally pick the electors, 10 is it any the less
constitutional, so far as discrimination goes, for the legislature to
request one or more persons of the legislature's political hue to per-
form this function? It is not most satisfactory to persons of another
political faith, but neither would legislative selection be satisfactory.
Nor is there a formidable attack in the assertion that selection by a
small group of persons does not meet the constitutional requirement
of appointment of electors by the State. For where the contention
was made that electors chosen in congressional districts was not
selection by the State, the court replied, "The State does not act by
its people in their collective capacity,* but through such political
agencies as are duly constituted and established.""
It is not clear that the possibilities of what the state legislature
might do with this power caused the Federal Convention great con-
cern. The problem of devising a method for electing the president
was the most difficult one the convention faced.12 There was heated
debate and considerable vacillation. Madison wrote to Jefferson that
"The modes of appointment proposed were various, as by the people
at large-by electors chosen by the people-by Executives of the
States-by the Congress,--Several other modifications were started.
The expedient at length adopted seemed to give pretty general satis-
PREsiDENCY (1898) 15. In 1892 Michigan reverted to the system of voting by
congressional districts for all but two of the electors. "The party accidentally
in power adopted this device with the express purpose of dividing the electoral
vote of the State, which it had no hope of obtaining upon a general popular
vote."
10 McPherson v. Blacker, supra note 6, at 40, 13 Sup. Ct. at 12, 36 L. ed. at
879. See, Clark, supra note 6, at 738, "In the first contested election in 1796,
three electors chosen on the Democratic-Republican ticket felt free to vote for
John Adams, the Federalist candidate, and thereby defeated Jefferson. .. "
"McPherson v. Blacker, supra note 6, at 40, 13 Sup. Ct. at 6, 36 L. ed. at 873.
FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) 160; 3 FARRANM,
THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911) 166: "The Convention, Sir,
were perplexed with no part of this plan so much as with the mode of choos-
ing the President of the United States," said James Wilson in the Pennsyl-
vania Convention.
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faction to the members."' 3 This final plan, which was brought in by
a committee, was the result of a compromise. 14 The convention
wished to avoid dependence of the executive upon the national legis-
lature and yet lacked confidence ina popular election. 15 Although the
thought was that each elector would exercise independent judgment
in casting his ballot, it was believed the number of favorite sons
would prevent a majority for any one person and the eventual
choice would be made by the national House of Representatives.' 6
Possibly this expectation precluded greater interest in the extent of
the state legislature's power.
The North Carolina situation is interesting not only as regards
the selection of presidential electors but as to the question of smaller
parties generally. An argument was presented to the Board of Elec-
tions in September which analyzed the presidential problem in sub-
stantially this manner: The legislature has directed that the ballots
contain the names of candidates who have been nominated by any
political party in this State or who have filed notice of their inde-
pendent candidacy.17 There are two definitions of the term "political
party" in the North Carolina statutes. The one in the primary laws
makes the term apply to all political parties having candidates for
13 FARRAND, THE REcoRns OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911) 132. Mad-
ison stated in the Virginia Convention, "That mode which was judged most
expedient was adopted, till experience should point out one more eligible."
Id., 331.
"IFARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) 166. Warren
records that Madison wrote to George Hay, "The difficulty of finding an
unexceptional process for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government
such as that of the United States was deeply felt by the Convention; and as
the final arrangement of it took place in the latter stage of the Session, it was
not exempt from a degree of hurrying influence produced by fatigue and
impatience in all such bodies; tho' the degree was much less than usually pre-
vails in them." WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUUTON (1928) 630.
This same work reports (p. 629) that Hamilton urged the adoption of the
committee's report stating that "he would take 'any system which promises
to save America from the dangers with which she is threatened'."
"' James Wilson and Gouverneur Morris were perhaps the staunchest advo-
cates of popular election, desiring to have the executive independent of both
the national and state legislatures. George Mason, Charles Pinckney and Hugh
Williamson thought it unwise for the people to select the executive. See,
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1928) 357-367, and FARRAND,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911). HORWILL, THE USAGES
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1925) 26. Cf. STANWOOD, supra note 9, at 3.
"FARRAxD, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) 167. Rufus King
wrote to C. R. King in 1823 that in his opinion the proper construction of
the constitution was that the legislatures might "designate those wht--Ataj
appoint the Electors altho' they themselves may not appoint them." FARRAND,
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL. CONVENTION (1911) 459. BECK, THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1924) 264.
17 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6055 (a5).
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state offices in the 1914 election, and in addition any political party
in whose behalf could be secured ten thousand signatures.' 8 This
is in the primary election law and can hardly be applicable to a gen-
eral election question when the general election laws themselves define
the term. The latter definition says a political party is an organiza-
tion whose candidate for governor received as many as fifty thousand
votes in the election of 1900.19 Of course that means the Democratic
and Republican parties, and them only.20 Article VI, §1 of the
North Carolina Constitution guarantees the right to vote, 21 and it
is contended this carries with it the incidental rights of combination
into political parties which may have the names of their candidates
printed on the ballot.22 There may be reasonable restrictions, but a
statute which restricts the right to the Democratic party and the Re-
publican party is entirely unreasonable. The argument concluded
that this general election definition was unconstitutional, and that
the presidential electors nominated by the Socialist party were en-
titled to a place on the ballot.
Possibly the foregoing analysis fails to distinguish between the
legislature's relation to the selection of presidential electors and the
legislature's function in prescribing a system for the election of other
officials. The first is the exercise of a power derived from the Fed-
eral Constitution, and which the State Constitution is powerless to
limit. 23 Thus it might be that the legislative definition of a political
party is unconstitutional for some purposes and not unconstitutional
for the selection of presidential electors. If the legislature's power
here is a plenary one, then could it not limit the candidates to Re-
'sN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §6052. This definition was adopted in
1915 and is part of "An Act to Provide Primary Elections Throughout the
State." N. C. Pui. LAws (1915) c. 101, §31.
21N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §5913. This definition was adopted in
1901.
' The vote for governor in 1900 was, Aycock (Dem.), 186,650; Adams
(Rep.), 126,296. NORTH CAROLINA MANUAL (1913) 1006.
1"Every male person born in the United States, and every male person
who has been naturalized, twenty-one years of age, and possessing the qualifica-
tions set out in this article shall be entitled to vote at any election by the people
in this State, except as herein otherwise provided."
See, State v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 128 N. W. 1041 (1910).
See, Clark, supra note 6, at 740. "The legislature of each state, of course,
is elected in the manner prescribed by its constitution, but the power and dis-
cretion vested in it to provide the manner in which the presidential electors
shall be chosen is derived solely from the C6nstitution of the United States,
and no state constitution can restrict the execution of such power. The federal
constitution selected a state agency as the depository of this power, but the
exercise of such power is given to the state legislature subject to no restriction
from the state constitution... .
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publicans and Democrats? This of course is not a happy state of
affairs, but probably a constitutional one.
Although North Carolina decisions on the point are lacking, it
seems to be accepted in other states that a political group may be
required to show a specified strength before it will be allowed a pri-
mary or its candidates be placed on the general election. ballot. 24
The requirement is sometimes expressed in a percentage of the total
vote cast at the last general election, or a certain number of petition-
ers may be demanded.25 Representation on the general election bal-
lot is permitted parties and candidates with a smaller strength than
is required before a primary may be had. The justification advanced
for these restrictions on candidates is a practical one-the size of
the ballot must have some limit.26 Petition requirements in the main
are small enough so that parties and candidates with an immediate
chance of success will not be kept off the ballot. It is, however,
exceedingly doubtful whether little or- no restrictions would really
2 "Three persons may claim to be a political party, just as the three tailors
of Tooley street assumed to be 'The People of England' It follows, if an
official ballot is to be used, nominations must be regulated in some way; other-
wise-the ballot would become the size of a blanket." DeWalt v. Bartley,
146 Pa. 529, 24 Atl. 185 (1892). See Milner v. Olin, 159 Mass. 487, 34 N. E.
721 (1893) ; State v. Poston, 58 Ohio St. 620, 51 N. E. 150 (1898) ; State v.
Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N. W. 174 (1905); In re Terry, 203 N. Y. 292, 96
N. E. 931 (1911); People v. Smith, 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. Y. 568 (1912) ; Cun-
ningham v. Cokely, 79 W. Va. 60, 90 S. E. 546 (1916).
' See for example, Wis. STAr. (1931) §5.05, primary election for party
polling one per cent of votes cast in last presidential election; and for any other
party presenting petition signed by one-sixth of voters in at least ten counties;
§5.26, nominations other than by primary made by petition of one thousand
voters, for a candidacy to be voted on throughout the state. New York re-
quires twelve thousand petitioners for independent nomination for a state-wide
office. N. Y. ELECTION LAW (1922) §137. There is not a semblance of uni-
formity among the states in these requirements.
I See, supra note 24. Cf. dissent of Marshall, J., in State v. Poston, 58
Ohio St. 620, 51 N. E. 150 (1898), "This simply places the size of the ballot
-a piece of paper-above the right of the elector secured to him by the con-
stitution." SALT, AMERmcAN PARTIES AND ELEcTIONS (1927) 380, "The excuse
for requiring numerous signatures is that otherwise there would be a plethora
of candidates. The argument is of doubtful validity. If a man is well known
and popular or if he is brought forward by the machine merely to draw votes
from a dangerous reform candidate, he will not be deterred by a somewhat
oppressive requirement. On the other hand, if he is obscure and without
backing, and yet can offer himself because few signatures are required, his
name will not add to the complexity of the ballot or injure the prospects of
other candidates. The task of the voter is affected, not by the presence of
many candidates-he will pick the man he knows and wants as easily from
among a dozen candidates as from among three-but by the multiplicity of
elective offices." To the effect that the Australian ballot has been a blow to
independent candidates and the small party, see, OSTROGORSKi, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PARTY SYSTEM (1921) 333; cf. SAIT, supra at 377.
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create a costly or inconvenient ballot. And every effort should be
made to encourage any manifestation of interest in government.2 7
As for the presidential ballot, a number of states have combined con-
venience with reality by striking from the ballot the columns of elec-
tors and printing instead the names of the presidential and vice-
presidential candidates-a vote for whom is a vote for their electors
on file with the secretary of state.28 A state with as many presi-
dential electors as North Carolina could recognize a large number of
parties without increasing the size of the ballot.2 9
Confusion in the North Carolina statutes results mainly because
of the two definitions of a political party. The general election
definition of 1901 crystallized the term for Republican and Dem-
ocrats. The primary election definition of 1915 recognizes the pos-
sibility of other parties and brings them under the primary act when
petitioned by ten thousand voters. But there is nothing in the pri-
mary act to make this definition supplant the 1901 general election
term, and it results from this line of reasoning that there is no way
for political groups other than the two major parties to have party
representation on the general election ballot. The view that a guar-
anty of the right to vote is also a guaranty of reasonable freedom in
party affiliation and representation would condemn as unconstitu-
tional a hard and fast two party definition. Another interpretation
of the statutes might be that since the statutes provide that candi-
dates of political parties shall be placed on the ballot, and the 1915
definition opens the way for new parties by petition, there is not a
two party limitation. This, it seems, ignores the title and purpose of
the 1915 law. But to make the ten thousand provision of the pri-
mary law a test for party representation in the general election would
still leave a discrimination against independent or non-partisan can-
didates who must have a ten per cent petition, 0 and that would
mean obtaining seventy thousand petitioners for a state-wide office,8 1
See, BRucE, AMERICAN PARTIES AND POLITICS (1927) 150. Minor parties
"testify to the transcendent position that principles and convictions hold in the
minds of the group as contrasted with political expediency."I ILL. ANN. STAT. (Callahan, 1925-1931 Supp.) c. 46, §1; IowA CODE (1931)
c. 45; MIcH. ComP. LAws (1929) §3246; NEB. ComP. STAT. (1929) c. 32,§220; OHIO CODE SERvIcE (Baldwin, 1929) §§4785-107; Wis. STAT. (1931)§6.23 (17) ; Pa. Laws 1931, No. 216. See, Aylsworth, The Presidential Slwrt
Ballot (1930) 24 Am. POL. Scr. REv., 966.
'A sample ballot in Wisconsin provides places for the candidates of six
parties in a seven by seven inch space. See, Wis. STAT. (1931) §6.23 (17).IN. C. CODE ANN. (Mich. 1931) §6055 (a6).
I In the 1932 election the votes for such offices approximated seven hundred
thousand. Raleigh News and Observer, December 7, 1932.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
an insuperable task. It is believed that North Carolina could adopt
a liberal election law and one that would assure good faith (which
should be the important consideration) on the part of candidates.
This might require of political groups which polled less than two
per cent of the total vote cast in the last preceding gubernatorial
election a petition signed by one per cent of such number for party
representation on the general election ballot for a state-wide office,
and a petition of two per cent of the votes cast in the preceding
election for the particular office of a local nature. For independent
candidates the requirements might be the same, a one per cent peti-
tion for a state-wide office and two per cent of the local vote for a
local office. The required strength for a primary election might be
two per cent of the vote in the last gubernatorial election or a peti-
tion of ten thousand voters. The gubernatorial vote in the 1932
election was over seven hundred thousand.3 2 A party which polls
two per cent, or fourteen thousand votes, should be entitled to a
place on the ballot, and, failing a two per cent vote, representation
should be accorded a group which secures petitioners equalling one
per cent of the gubernatorial vote. Even these requirements may
be too rigorous.
E. M. PERKINS.
Banks and Banking-Interest Allowable to Depositors
After Insolvency.
The assets of an insolvent 'bank were more than sufficient in
amount for the payment in full of the aggregate principal amount of-
all claims of depositors. In a controversy without action submitted
upon a statement of facts agreed, it was elwd that the depositors were
entitled to interest as against the stockholders of the bank, from in-
solvency until final payment by the receiver; that insolvency was the
equivalent of a refusal by the bank to pay and in legal effect a waiver
of a demand for payment by the depositors.'
' The results certified by the State Board of Canvassers, as reported in the
Raleigh News and Observer, December 7, 1932, give Ehringhaus (Dem.),
497,657; Frazier (Rep.), 212,561. The vote in the presidential election was,
Roosevelt (Dem.), 497,566; Hoover (Rep.), 208,344; Thomas (Soc.), 5,591;
Upshaw (Prohib.), 89. Thus the vote polled by the Socialist party was less
than eight-tenths of one per cent of the total state vote.
'Hackney v. Hood, 203 N. C. 486, 166 S. E. 323 (1932).
A news item from the Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News on December 17,
1932, was headed: "Three Closed Banks Bring 100 Per Cent." Of these three
North Carolina banks, two paid depositors interest, one of the two having assets
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Upon insolvency of a bank, deposits become due and actionable2
and in some jurisdictions have the same efficacy as judgments.8
Courts often announce a general rule that, after property of an
insolvent passes into the hands of a receiver, no interest is allowable
upon claims against the fund.4 This rule has been explained as apply-
ing only in cases in which the assets were less than the liabilities.5
Accordingly, the rule does not prevent the running of interest where
the assets are sufficient, 6 and interest is allowable in such case. 7
In a distribution among ordinary creditors,8 interest is allowable
to all or none.9 If the assets are less than the principal liabilities, no
left over for the stockholders. This item is noted in order to show that the
problem disposed of in the instant case does arise.
I Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788, 30 L. ed. 864 (1886) ; Hack-
ney v. Hood, supra note 1; State ex rel. McConnell v. Park Bank & Trust Co.,
151 Tenn. 195, 268 S. W. 638, 39 A. L. R. 449 (1925) ; Gilbertson v. Northern
Trust Co., 53 N. D. 502, 207 N. W. 42 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 1353 (1926) ; Eng-
land v. Hughes, 141 Ark. 235, 217 S. W. 13 (1920); Williams v. Johnson, 50
Mont. 7, 144 Pac. 768, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 595 (1914); People v. Merchants'
Trust Co., 187 N. Y. 293, 79 N. E. 1004 (1907) ; Baker v. Williams, 42 Ore.
213, 70 Pac. 711 (1902); McGowan v. McDonald, 111 Cal. 57, 43 Pac. 418
(1896).
'Nat. Bank v. Mechanics' Nat. Bank, 94 U. S. 437, 24 L. ed. 176 (1876);
State ex rel. McConnell v. Park Bank & T. Co., supra note 2, 268 S. W. at 642:
"Construing the act, we hold that in insolvency proceedings allowed claims have
the efficacy of judgments; and, further, that, in such proceedings, formal de-
mand for payment is not necessary, but that such demand will be treated as
having been made, and will bear interest from the filing of the petition in cases
where a surplus exists after the payment of the face value of all claims."
Dorland v. Fidelity Development Co., 104 Misc. Rep. 97, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1000
(1918). Re John Osborn's Sons & Co., 177 Fed. 184 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910), 29
L. R. A. (N. S.) 887 (1911) (as to alldwed claims in bankruptcy).
'Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line, 233 U. S. 261, 34 Sup. Ct. 502, 58 L. ed.
949 (1914); Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U. S. 95, 13 Sup. Ct. 824, 37 L. ed.
663 (1893) ; 23 R. C. L. 104. As to receivers: Henricks v. Higley & Co., 199
Iowa 765, 202 N. W. 746 (1925).
'Am. Iron Co. v. Seaboard Air Line, supra note 4, at 266, 34 Sup. Ct. at
504, 58 L. ed. at 953: "And it is true, as held in Tredegar Co. v. Seaboard Ry.,
183 Fed. Rep. 289, 290, that as a general rule, after property of an insolvent is
in custodia legis interest thereafter accruing is not allowed on debts payable
out of the funds realized by a sale of the property. But that is not because the
claims had lost their interest-bearing quality during that period, but is a neces-
sary and enforced rule of distribution, due to the fact that in case of receiver-
ships the assets are generally insufficient to pay debts in full." Moore v.
Watauga & Y. R. Co., 173 N. C. 726, 727, 92 S. E. 361, 362 (1917) : "Under the
law of this State the appointment of a receiver for a corporation does not have
the effect eo instanti to stop the interest upon all of its interest bearing obliga-
tions."
'Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Willys Corp., 8 Fed. (2d) 463 (C. C.
A. 2nd, 1925).
" Nolte v. Hudson Nay. Co., 8 Fed. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925) ; Du Pont
v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 Atl. 39 (1918), 7 A. L. R. 955 (1920).
' As to general deposits, special deposits and deposits for a specific purpose,
see (1931) 10 N. C. L. Rlv. 381.
' Young v. Teutonia Bank & Trust Co., 134 La. 879. 64 So. 806 (1914).
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interest is allowable as between them,10 because the assets are equita-
bly the assets of all the creditors."' Obviously, to allow ordinary
creditors interest in such case would be in effect a mere matter of
bookkeeping entries and would not affect the ratable proportion to
which each is entitled. But where the assets are greater than the
liabilities, the ordinary creditor is entitled to both principal and
interest before the return of any surplus to the stockholders of the
bank,' 2 even where it is necessary to assess the stockholders the
amount of their statutory liability.' 3 Interest from insolvency until
" New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lombard Inv. Co., 73 Fed. 537, 554 (C.
C. W. D. Mo., 1896) : "Interest does not run, as against the estate, after the
assignment or declared insolvency, unless there are funds sufficient on hand to
pay all of the demands and accrued interest; otherwise, interest is to be allowed
up to the time of the declared insolvency only." Taylor v. Coming Bank &
Trust Co., 185 Ark. 691, 48 S. W. (2d) 1102 (1932) : "The general rule is that,
unless there are sufficient funds to pay all the depositors, no depositor is entitled
to interest on his claim." No interest was allowed in the following cases,
probably because of insufficient funds: Peoples' Nat. Bank v. Payne, 26 Fed.
(2d) 208 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Shaw, Banking Com'r., v. Brown, 29 S. W.
(2d) 301 (Tex. 1930).
See People v. American Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y.'371, 65 N. E. 200,
201 (1902) : "Interest should not run in favor of one creditor at the expense of
another, while the law, acting for all, is administering the assets. If the assets
are sufficient to pay all, including interest, it must be paid, for, as against the
corporation itself, interest should be allowed before the return of any surplus
to the stockholders. As between the creditors themselves, however, no interest
should be allowed during.the process of administration, and the delay necessarily
resulting therefrom, because the assets are equitably their assets, the adminis-
tration is for their benefit, and the delay is necessary to enable them to take
action to present their claims in proper form, as well as to enable the court to
put the assets in shape for distribution."
" Richmond v. Irons, supra note 2; Chemical Nat. Bank v. Bailey, 5 Fed.
Cas. No. 2,635 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1875); State ex rel. McConnell v. Park
Bank & Trust Co.; People v. Merchants' Trust Co., both suprar note 2. See
People v. American Loan & Trust Co., supra note 11. Colorado & So. Ry. v.
Docking, 124 Kan. 48, 257 Pac. 743 (1927) (by inference). Contra: Lippitt v.
Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369 (1914) ; Angello v. Han-
over Trust Co., 253 Mass. 160, 148 N. E. 138 (1925). As to surplus in bank-
rupt's estate: Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed. 459 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911) L. R. A.
1915B, 884 (1915). As to surplus of insolvent corporation's assets: In re Em-
pire State Surety Co., 125 Misc. Rep. 806, 212 N. Y. Supp. 258 (1925).
' Hackney v. Hood, supra note 1; Op. Att. Gen. No. 265 (Ky. 1928) ; Flynn
v. American Bkg. & T. Co., 104 Me. 141, 69 Atl. 771, 129 Am. St. Rep. 378(1908). 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 428 (1909); Mahoney v. Bernhard, 45 App. Div.
499, 63 N. Y. Supp. 642 (1899). See Sickles v. Herold, 149 N. Y. 332, 43 N. E.
852, 853 (1896) : "In case it should turn out that the bank was solvent, and that
the superintendent improperly took possession, it might be inequitable to impose
upon the stockholders the liability to pay interest upon all deposits." An action
to enforce the statutory liability of bank stockholders should be prosecuted in
the Commissioner of Banks' individual name, not under his official title. Com-
missioner of Banks v. Carrier, 202 N. C. 850, 165 S. E. 678 (1932). But in no
event may the stockholders be held liable for more than their statutory liability.
Richmond v. Irons, supra note 2; Mahoney v. Bernhard, supra. Bank stock-
holders may not be assessed their additional liability to the par value of their
158 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
final payment by the receiver is computable at the legal rate, regard-
less of the rate contracted, in order not to favor one class of creditors
at the expense of another.14
In some states interest on preferred claims is not allowable where
the assets are less than all the liabilities. 15 The reason given for the
rule is that every other creditor has the same right as one holding a
preferred claim, except the right to be paid first' 06 It follows that
preferred claims have no preference as to interest over ordinary
claims from the date of insolvency."7
Where money is withheld in good faith by an insolvent bank
under circumstances creating a relationship of agency or trust, no
interest is allowable.' s But it has been held that interest actually
shares until the value of the bank's assets in proportion to its debts has been
ascertained. Corporation Commission v. Bank, 193 N. C. 113, 136 S. E. 362
(1927).
"' People v. Merchants' Trust Co., supra note 2. Contra: American Surety
Co. of N. Y. v. Peyton, 244 N. W. 74 (Minn. 1932); Davis v. Wilson,
105 Kan. 560, 185 Pac. 41 (1919). Interest allowed in case of a certificate of
deposit, which had a provision that no interest would be paid after maturity:
Baxley Bkg. Co. v. Gaskins, 145 Ga. 508, 89 S. E. 516 (1916) ; Note (1921) 15
A. L. R. 650.
1 Clark Sparks, etc., v. Americus Nat. Bank, 230 Fed. 738 (S. D. Ga., 1916);
Taylor v. Corning Bank & Trust Co., supra note 10; Leach v. Sanborn State
Bank, 210 Iowa 613, 231 N. W. 497, 69 A. L. R. 1206 (1930). Interest was not
allowed on a preferred claim in Guignon v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Mont. 140, 55
Pac. 1051 (1899), nor was it allowed in State v. Banking Corporation, 74 Mont.
491, 241 Pac. 626 (1925), but, in McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 79
Mont. 233, 255 Pac. 733 (1927), interest was allowed. However, the rule in the
latter case has now been changed by statute. Mont. Laws 1931, c. 145, §134.
In Rugger v. Hammond, 95 Wash. 85, 163 Pac. 408 (1917), there was a dictum
to the effect that interest could not be allowed on a preferred claim, but, in Hitt
Fireworks Co. v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 121 Wash. 261, 209 Pac. 680
(1922) and in Northwest Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 130
Wash. 33, 225 Pac. 825, 39 A. L. R. 92Z (1924), interest was allowed, neither
case referring to the Rugger case; but upon rehearing of the latter case, 132
Wash. 449, 231 Pac. 951, 39 A. L. R. 928 (1925), the court reversed itself and
adopted the dictum of the Rugger case. Interest was allowed in the following
cases, but it is nat clear whether or not there were sufficient funds: Shaw v.
Morrison, 14 S. W. (2d) 953 (Tex. 1929) ; Johnson v. Farmers' Bank, 223 Mo.
App. 513, 11 S. W. (2d) 1090 (1928).
"Taylor v. Coming Bank & Trust Co., supra note 10.
'Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, supra note 15; People v. American Loan &
Trust Co., supra note 11. Contra: American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Peyton,
supra note 14. As to insolvent corporation: In re Empire State Surety Co.,
supra note 12; American Surety Co. v. Carbon Timber Co., 263 Fed. 295(C. C. A. 8th, 1919).Smith Reduction Corp. v. Williams, 15 Fed. (2d) 874 (E: D. N. C.,
1926) ; Poisson v. Williams, 15 Fed. (2d) 582 (E. D. N. C., 1926) ; Butler v.
Western German Bank, 159 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 5th, 1908) ; Hallett v. Fish, 123
Fed. 201 (C. C. D. Vt., 1903) ; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. School Dist. No. 8, 94
Fed. 705, 709 (C. C. A. 9th, 1899) : "No interest is chargeable against the fund
in the receiver's hands, based upon his erroneous action in disallowing claims.
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earned may be recovered where there is a showing that the fund
earned interest while in the hands of the receiver.19 If the trust
fund claimed has been commingled with the general assets of the
bank, the claimant becomes an ordinary creditor as to it and is not
entitled to preference. 20
By statute in two states the amount of interest payable to the
various claimants has been definitely fixed.21 In view of the uncer-
It is his function, by and under the direction of the comptroller, to disburse
the fund according to the law. In the matter of allowance or disallowance of
claims he must exercise his judgment. If he makes an erroneous decision, the
law does not contemplate that the other creditors shall suffer therefor." Fokken
v. Smith, 235 N. W. 120 (S. D. 1931); Ex parte Hernlen, 156 S. C. 181, 153
S. E. 133, 69 A. L. R. 443 (1930) ; Shaw v. McCord, 18 S. W. (2d) 200 (Tex.
1929). Contra: .Hall v. Citizens State Bank of Superior, 122 Neb. 636, 241 N.
W. 123 (1932). Owner of bonds misappropriated by bank held entitled to re-
cover the face value of the bonds with interest accordikig to their tenor up to
the time of their conversion: Larson v. Baird, 60 N. D. 775, 236 N. W. 634(1931). Interest is allowed on dividends where it is necessary to put the
dividend creditor upon equality with the other creditors: Armstrong v. Amer-
ican Exchange Bank, 133 U. S. 433, 10 Sup. Ct. 450, 33 L. ed. 747 (1889) ; Bank
of 1Roxie v. Lampton, 104 Miss. 427, 61 So. 650 (1913). Interest was allowed in
the case of an insolvent debtor where payment of the dividend was withheld
because of an unsuccessful contest of the claim: In re Ilion Nat. Bank, 59 Hun
307, 12 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1891).
"Sunflower County v. Bank of Drew, 139 Miss. 408, 104 So. 355, 357(1925) : "It is not a mere case of interest being given as damages for wrongful
detention, but it is a holding of the trustee to a strict accounting of the trust
and refusal to permit the trustee to profit by its own wrong." But no interest is
allowable where there is no showing that the fund earned interest. Macon
Grocery Co. v. Mobley, 174 Ga. 185, 162 S. E. 711 (1932) ; Vincent Grain Co. v.
Docking, 125 Kan. 383, 265 Pac. 38 (1928) ; Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530,
263 Pac. 993 (1928), 73 A. L. R. 59 (1931). No interest is allowable where it
is impossible for the fund to earn interest: Richardson v. Louisville Co., 94
Fed. 442 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899).
'Bank v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 382, 160 S. E. 360 (1931);
Skinner v. Porter, supra note 19; McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co.,
supra note 15.
= Mont. Laws, supra note 15:
"The order of payment of the debts of a bank liquidated by the Superin-
tendent of Bafnks shall be as follows:(1) The expense of liquidation, including compensation of agents, employees
and attorneys.(2) All funds of any other bank in process of liquidation by the Superin-
tendent of Banks and placed on deposit by the Superintendent of Banks.(3) All funds held by the bank in trust.
(4) Debts due depositors....
(5) Interest on all the foregoing classes of claims without regard to the
priority computed from the date of closing of the bank at the rate of seven per
centum (7%) per annum.(6) Unliquidated claims for damages and the like, including claims of stock-
holders for amounts claimed to have been voluntarily advanced to the bank.
Idaho Laws 1925, c. 133, §77:
"The order of payment of the debts of a bank liquidated by the Commis-
sioner shall be as follows:
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tainty in many other jurisdictions, it is believed that similar legisla-
tion would be highly desirable in order to prevent further litigation.
The North Carolina banking law might be readily amended by insert-
ing immediately following paragraph number five of the North Caro-
lina Code Annotated (Michie, 1931) Chapter 5, section 218(c), sub-
section 14, a new paragraph numbered six:
Interest at the legal rate on all the foregoing classes of claims, without
regard to priority, to be computed from the date upon which the banking com-
missioner takes possession of the assets and business of the bank22
A. E. GAaRETT, JR.
Damages-Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract.
Plaintiff sold his interest in the defendant company upon the
condition that he would be retained at his position as business man-
ager of a newspaper for three years at a salary of $8,000 per year.
He alleged that the defendant breached this contract by willfully and
maliciously discharging him and that he was entitled to both actual
and punitive damages. Held, that the allegations were insufficient to
show a right to punitive damages. 1
As a general rule punitive or exemplary damages are not recover-
able in actions for breach of contract.2 This is true irrespective of
(1) The expense of liquidation, including compensation of agents, em-
ployees and attorneys.
(2) All funds held by the bank in trust.
(3) Debts due depositors, . .
(4) All contractual liabilities pro rata.
(5) Interest on all the foregoing classes of claims without regard to the
priority of the principal computed as follows:
Savings accounts at the same rate they bore at the time of the closing of the
bank until the next regular date for the computation and crediting of the
interest thereon, and thereafter at the rate of seven per cent (7%) per annum;
time certificates of deposit at the rate fixed in the certificate until the same be-
come due by their terms, and thereafter at the rate of seven per cent (7%) per
annum; all other contractual obligations bearing interest at the rate they bore
at the time of closing until due by their terms, and thereafter at seven per cent
(7%) per annum, and those not bearing interest, at the rate of seven per cent
(7%) per annum from the time when said bank came into the possession of the
Commissioner; no interest to be compounded.
(6) Unliquidated claims for damages and the like."
It is suggested that there be an amendment to the North Carolina banking
law similar to paragraph number two of the Montana statute above.
' T he Commissioner of Banks has been following as an administrative
policy the very procedure set forth in the proposed statute (Letter of Dec. 28,
1932 from C. I. Taylor, Liquidating Agent).
'Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal Co., 165 S. E. 203 (S. C. 1932).2 Cochran v. Hall, 8 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925); Baumgarten v. Alli-
ance Assur. Co., 159 Fed. 275 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1908) ; Davis & Son v. Ruple,
222 Ala. 52, 130 So. 772 (1930); Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 75 Colo.
340, 225 Pac. 837 '(1924); American Ry. Express Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the motive which prompted defendant's breach.3 The reason is that
in contract actions only such damages can be recovered as were
reasonably within the contemplation of the parties when they made
the contract, namely, the loss of the bargain.4 But there are certain
exceptions to this rule. In actions for breach of a contract to marry,
which are in fact based on tort as much as on contract, damages may
be recovered for injury to feelings and wounded pride,5 and ex-
emplary damages may be awarded where the breach is wanton and
deliberate. 6 Moreover, when the breach of other contracts is accom-
panied by fraud, malice, abuse, or such oppressive conduct as itself
constitutes a tort, punitive damages are sometimes allowed.7
107 So. 761 (1926); Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664, L. R. A.
1916B 622, Ann. Cas. 1917E 410 (1915); Trout v. Watkins Livery & Under-
taking Co., 148 Mo. App. 621, 130 S. W. 136 (1910); Richardson v. Wilming-
ton & W. R. Co., 126 N. C. 100, 35 S. E. 235 (1900) ; Ketcham v. Miller, 104
Ohio St. 372, 136 N. E. 145 (1922); Reaves v. Western Union Tel. Co., 110
S. C. 233, 96 S. E. 295 (1918) ; Crouch v. Ramirez, 269 S. W. 113 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925); Gibson v. St. Antony Hotel, 198 S. W. 412 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917) ; cases collected in notes, 3 Ann. Cas. 413, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 412; HALE,
DAMAGES (2d ed. 1912) §318; SEwDcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §370. See
McCormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages (1930) 8
N. C. L. Rxv. 129 at 140.
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rowell, 153 Ala. 295, 45 So. 73 (1907) ; Inde-
pendent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 178 . W. 582 (1920)';
see Hunter v. Sutton, 45 Nev. 430, 205 Pac. 785, 788 (1922) ; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Reeves, 34 Okla. 468, 475, 126 Pac. 216, 217 (1912). SEmaWic'k,
op. cit. supra note 2, §603: "It -may be considered then to be established that
the motives of the defendant in breaching his contract are to be disregarded."
'Davis & Son v. Ruple, supra note 2; Trustees of Horton's Estate v. Sher-
win, 63 Okla. 259, 164 Pac. 469 (1917); cf. McCall v. Gloucester Lumber Co.,
196 N. C. 597, 146 S. E. 579 (1929).
" Gerber v. Shwartz, 124 Me. 441, 127 Atl. 903 (1925); O'Brien v. Man-
ning, 101 Misc. Rep. 123, 166 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1917); SEDGWICIC, Op. Cit.
supra rlote 2, §637.
'Hasted v. Van Wagnen, 243 Mich. 350, 220 N. W. 762 (1928) (damages
aggravated by seduction); Drobnich v. Bach, 159 Minn. 258, 198 N. W. 669
(1924) ; Thorn v. Tetrick, 93 W. Va. 455, 116 S. E. 762 (1923) ; HALE, loc. cit.
supra note 2; Suxwrcic, op. cit. supra note 2, §§370, 637a; see Trout v. Wat-
kins Livery & Undertaking Co., supra note 2, 130 S. W. at 143; Richardson v.
Wilmington & W. R. Co., supra note 2 at 102, 35 S. E. at 235. Dibdell, J., in
Drobnich v. Bach, supra: "An action for the breach of a marriage contract is
in form in contract, but damages are awarded as in tort actions."
'Burrus v. Nevada, California-Oregon Ry., 38 Nev. 156, 145 Pac. 926
(1915) ; Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753, 48 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1 (1913); Huffman v. Moore, 122 S. C. 220, 115 S. E. 634 (1923);
Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S. C. 137, 108 S. E. 189 (1921); Dallas Hotel Co. v.
McCue, 25 S. W. (2d) 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Scheps v. Giles, 222 S. W.
348 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; see Cochran v. Hall, supra note 2, at 985; Bir-
mingham Transfer & Traffic Co. v. Still, 7 Ala. App. 556, 61 So. 611, 614
(1913); American Ry. Express Co. v. Bailey, supra note 2, 107 So. at 763;
Hood v. Moffett, supra note 2, 69 So. at 665; Colby v. Daniels, 125 Okla. 202,
257 Pac. 298, 301 (1927) ; Reaves v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 2,
96 S. E. at 297; Welbourn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 115, 49 S. E. 232, 234, 3 Ann.
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Thus, exemplary damages have been recovered in the following
contract actions: where an employer discharged the plaintiff and
asserted before others that she was a liar ;8 where the manager of a
hotel in discharging the plaintiff clerk rudely took hold of her and
shoved her into a public room ;9 where a landlord who breached his
contract with a cropper ran him off the premises and took his crops ;1o
where the defendant in violation of his contract fenced in his well
and cut off the water supply for plaintiff's stock during a severe
drought ;11 where the defendant misrepresented the condition of the
car sold and then breached his contract of warranty ;12 where the de-
fendant, having knowledge of the illness of the plaintiff's intestate,
ejected him from its train;13 and where the defendant breached a
contract to run a special train to convey the plaintiff's injured son and
falsely pretended that the train had to go elsewhere.1 4
On the other hand, recovery of punitive damages has been re-
fised: where the defendant's superintendent discharged the plaintiff
and dragged or shoved her from the mill ;15 where a liveryman who
knew of the plaintiff's illness had agreed to carry her home from the
hospital and then refused to go all the way because of the condition
of the streets ;16 where vendors breached a contract to drill a well
and irrigate land which they had induced the plaintiff to buy ;17 and
where the defendant in breach of a lease forcefully entered and
ejected the plaintiff.' s
Smart money is awarded cautiously, even in torts. To grant it
means adding a touch of vengeance to the compensatory purpose of
Cas. 407, 410 (1904). Tortious conduct, however malicious or inexcusable,
committed after the breach, will not justify recovery of punitive damages in
the contract action. Okla. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 170 S. W. 1062, 1064 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914).
8 Scheps v. Giles, supra note 7.
' Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, supra note 7.
" Sullivan v. Calhoun, supra note 7.
nWestfall v. Perry, 23 S. W. 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
' Huffman v. Moore, supra note 7.
" Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., supra note 7. Many of the suits against
carriers are based on tort for breach of public duty for which punitive dam-
ages are allowed. Webb v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 76 S. C. 193, 56 S. E.
954 (1907).
" Burrus v. Nevada, California-Oregon Ry., supra note 7.
"Davis & Son v. Ruple, miprc note 2; ef. Elmore v. Atl. Coast L. R. Co.,
191 N. C. 182, 131 S. E. 633, 43 A. L. R. 1072 (1926); Clayton v. Oliver,
(1930) A. C. 209, 16 B. R. C. 559; Addis v. Gramophone Co., Ltd., (1909)
A. C. 488, 3 B. R. C. 98.
" Trout v. Watkins Livery & Undertaking Co., supra note 2.
l Cochran v. Hall, supra note 2.
'
8 Ketcham v. Miller, supra note 2.
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damages. Perhaps, instead of a rule based on the supposed require-
ments of forms of actions, subject to omnibus exceptions, what we
actually have, as illustrated by the foregoing, is an administrative line
drawn between situations which on the one hand are so harsh as to
call for some punishment and those, on the other, where purely
remedial relief is deemed enough. In any event, the principal case
seems correctly decided.
JULE MCMICHAEL.
Extradition-Sufficiencv of Evidence on Habeas Corus.
Upon proper requisition, charging one Bailey with murder in
South Carolina, the Governor of North Carolina issued a warrant
of extradition. The accused obtained a writ of habeas corpus. At
the hearing three witnesses identified him as the man who killed one
Hunt. Bailey offered many witnesses to prove that he was not at
the scene of the crime. The trial judge discharged him. Held: The
finding of the judge upon competent evidence is conclusive on
appeal.'
The right of extradition is founded upon the Constitution2 and
laws of the United States.3 But in addition states have passed laws
which are to be complied with in so far as they are consistent with
the federal Constitution and statutes. 4 The prerequisite to extra-
dition is that the person whose return is sought should be a fugitive
from justice.5 The warrant issued by the governor of the asylum
state to have the accused arrested and delivered to the agent of the
demanding state is not conclusive, but the extradition proceedings
are subject to review on writ of habeas corpus.6
I In re Bailey, 203 N. C. 362, 166 S. E. 165 (1932).
2 U. S. Const., Art. 4, §2, cl. 2: "A person charged in any state with
treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in
another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction
of the crime."
IU. S. REv. STAT., §§5278, 5279 (1874) ; 1 STAT. 302 (1873) ; 18 U. S. C. A.,
§662.
'Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 36 Sup. Ct. 290, 60 L. ed. 562 (1915);
9 U. L. A. 108 (1932); North Carolina, with seven other states, has adopted
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act: P. L., 1931, ch. 124, N. C. CoDE AkN.
(Michie, 1931) §§4556 (a) to 4556 (y).
I The accused must have incurred guilt while in the state seeking his return:
Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Fed. 967 (S. D. N. Y.) 1917; Tenn. v. Jackson,
36 Fed. 258, 1 L. R. A. 370 (E. D. Tenn. 1888) ; Taft v. Lord, 92 Conn. 539,
103 Atl. 644, L. R. A. 1918E 545 (1918).
'Biddinger v. N. Y. Police Com'r., 245 U. S. 128, 38 Sup. Ct. 41, 62 L. ed.
193 (1917) ; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 25 Sup. Ct. 282, 49 L. ed. 515
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The issuance of the warrant of extradition makes a primta facie
case that the accused is a fugitive from justice, and the burden of
proof is on him to show the contrary.7 When the extradition papers
are in proper form, sufficiently charging the accused with a crime,8
the only evidence admissible is that which tends to prove that the
accused was not in the demanding state at the time the crime was
alleged to have been committed;9 or that he is not the person
charged. 10
There is no fixed rule as to the quantum of evidence the accused
must introduce in order to obtain a discharge. Where there is merely
contradictory or conflicting evidence on the subject of presence in,
or absence from the demanding state, no court should discharge
him.". It has been held in New York that a preponderance of ev-
idence is sufficient.' 2 The United States courts and many of the
(1905) ; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 Sup. Ct. 291, 29 L. ed. 544 (1885) ;
In re Veasey, 196 N. C. 662, 146 S. E. 599 (1929) ; Chase v. State, 93 Fla.
963, 113 So. 103 (1927); Ex parte Massee, 95 S. C. 315, 79 S. E. 97, 46
L. R. A. (N. S.) 781 (1913); 9 U. L. A. 112 (1932); N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §4556 (i). Contra: Ex parte Germain, 258 Mass. 289, 155
N. E. 12 (1927) (where the offer of 'proof that the accused was not in the
demanding state at the time of the alleged crime was held to raise questions of
fact as to credibility of witnesses and alibi not triable on petition for habeas
corpis and insufficient to show that he was not a fugitive from justice within
the meaning of the federal Constitution).
"Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222, 65 L. ed. 497 (1921);
Munsey v. Clough; Roberts v. Reilly, both supra note 6; Raftery ex rel. Hule
Fong v. Bligh, 55 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) ; State ex rel. Treseder v.
Remann, 165 Wash. 92, 4 Pac. (2d) 866, 78 A. L. R. 412 (1931); Dawson v.
Smith, 150 Ga. 352, 103 S. E. 847 (1920) ; Ex parte Walters, 106 Miss. 439, 64
So. 2 (1914) ; Ex parte Massee, supra note 6.8 in re Hubbard, 201 N. C. 472, 160 S. E. 569 (1931) (where requisition
papers failed to substantially charge the commission of crime the accused was
discharged on writ of habeas corpus) ; noted in (1931) 10 N. C. L. REV. 292.
'Biddinger v. N. Y. Police Com'r., supra note 6; Levy v. Splain, 267 Fed.
333, 50 App. D. C. 31 (1920) ; Kollerman v. Johnson, 184 Minn. 309, 238 N. W.
490, 77 A. L. R. 899 (1931); State v. Westhues, 318 Mo. 928, 2 S. W. (2d)
612 (1928).
11 Raftery ex rel. Huie Fong v. Bligh, supra note 7; Chase v. State, supra
note 6; see Ex parte Jowell, 87 Tex. Cr. Rep. 556, 223 S. W. 456, 11 A. L. R.
1407 (1920).
1 Munsey v. Clough, supra note 6; People v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100, 28 Sup.
Ct. 58, 52 L. ed. 121 (1907) ; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148,
29 L. ed. 250 (1885); U. S. v. Williams, 6 F. (2d) 13 (E. D. La. 1925)
(where there was an affidavit introduced to show that the accused robbed the
affiant, and a large number of "witnesses swore in court on behalf of the re-
lator to prove that he was not a fugitive from justice" it was held that the
governor's warrant was conclusive on disputed facts) ; People v. Meyering, 349
IIl. 198, 181 N. E. 620 (1932) ; Chandler v. Sipes, 103 Neb. 11, 170 N. W. 604
(1919) ; State v. Currie, 2 Ala. App. 251, 56 So. 736 (1911).
'People ex rel. Fuchs v. Police Com'r., 83 Misc. Rep. 643, 32 N. Y. Cr.
Rep. 465, 146 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1914).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
state courts require clear and satisfactory proof that the accused is
not a fugitive from justice.13 Some authorities say that the evidence
must be conclusive.1 4 There are cases where contradictory evidence
as to presence in the foreign state will not even be admitted. 15 But
when heard, the evidence should be regarded liberally in favor of the
demanding state.1 6
The position of a judge reviewing extradition proceedings on
habeas corpus is somewhat analogous to that of a magistrate deter-
mining the question as to whether the prisoner should be bound over
for trial. And some courts have said that the evidence for extra-
dition need only have that degree of certainty which would justify a
magistrate to commit the accused.' 7
All cases, including the instant one, assert as a general rule that
no case of extradition should be decided from the standpoint of guilt
or innocence of the person demanded.' 8 But in the instant case the
lower court said: ".... Under the testimony I don't think there would
be a jury anywhere that would ever find him guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt. I shall, therefore, discharge him under the writ and let
him go." These remarks were recognized by the Supreme Court as
Hogan v. O'Neill, supra note 7; Levy v. Splain, supra note 9; Ellison v.
Splain, 261 Fed. 247 (App. D. C. 1919); Ople v. Weinbrenner, 285 Mo. 365,
226 S. W. 256 (1920): "We have before us the testimony of two or more
witnesses that the plaintiffs were present at the scene of the crime and par-
ticipated in the shooting. This is substantial evidence, and though we might
consider the testimony preponderated which tended to show they were in St.
Louis, Mo., at the time, we cannot affirm that the evidence meets the standard
of the Supreme Court of the United States in being clear 'and satisfactory, or
so convincing as to admit of no question."
" Hyatt' v. New York, 188 U. S. 691, 23 Sup. Ct. 456, 47 L. ed. 657 (1902)
(the prima facie case must stand unless the accused overturns it "by admission
or by other conclusive evidence") ; Hayes v. Palmer, 21 App. D. C. 450
(1903); People ex rel. Steele v. Mulrooney, 139 Misc. Rep. 520, 248 N. Y.
Supp. 520 (1931); State v. Brown, 162 Minn. 520, 203 N. W. 226 (1925);
Hansen v. Edwards, 210 Mo. App. 35, 240 S. W. 489 (1922).
"E.g., Ex parte Wallace, 265 Mass. 101, 163 N. E. 870 (1928).
"1 Barrett v. Bigger, 17 F. (2d) 669, 670 (C. A. D. C. 1927): "... In con-
struing the evidence we are not to be governed by the technical rules as in the
case of a trial for a crime, but to regard it liberally in favor of the demanding
state, 'because in delivering up an accused person to the authorities of a sister
state' we 'are not sending him for trial to an alien jurisdiction, with laws
which our standards might condemn, but are simply returning him to be tried,
still under the protection of the federal Constitution, but in the manner pro-
vided by the state against the laws of which it is charged that he has
offended'. .. ."
'Ex parte Flournoy, 310 Mo. 355, 275 S. W. 923 (1925).; Ex parte Jowell,
supra note 10; see Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. 298, 307 (W. D. Ark. 1883).
1 Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 35 Sup. Ct. 137, 59 L. ed. 302 (1914);
see Munsey v. Clough; Ex parte Massee, both spra note 6; Dawson v. Smith,
supra note 7; State v. Westhues, supra note 9.
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an erroneous basis for the lower court's decision, but the written
judgment was held to speak the mind of the trial judge. Actually
the facts do not seem consistent with the proposition of law. 19
The formal judgment says ". . that the State of South Carolina
has failed to show probable cause for holding the said Ray Bailey in
custody, or that he committed the alleged crime .... and [the State
of South Carolina] has failed to produce sufficient evidence to war-
rant the court in refusing the writ, .. ." It appears that the formal
judgment views the case from the standpoint of guilt, and also indi-
cates that the burden of producing "sufficient evidence to warrant the
court in refusing the writ" was placed on the demanding state, in-
stead of requiring the accused to rebut the prima fade case made by
the governor's warrant.
Since the question of the accused's presence in the demanding
state is the only proper issue to be considered at the hearing, the ev-
idence introduced by Bailey was merely contradictory on this issue
and not sufficient to overcome the evidence offered by the demanding
state; and whatever was the actual basis for the decision of the trial
judge, the result is contrary to other decisions and, it is believed, to
what "justice appertains." 20  No state should, through proceedings
in its courts, become a refuge by harboring offenders against the
laws of other states. Where there is a doubt as to whether the
accused is a fugitive from justice he should not be discharged.
W. E. ANGLIN.
Garnishment-Payment to Creditor by Surety After
Garnishment of Debtor.
A has a cause of action against B; B is a creditor of C; C has a
surety. A sues B and serves C as garnishee. C then makes arrange-
ments with his surety and creditors whereby the surety pays immedi-
ately 75% of the claims of creditors, and C gives his note for the re-
mainder, agreeing also to reimburse the surety. He then files answer
to the garnishment process stating that he is indebted to B only on
the note given to B as creditor. On trial, judgment is rendered
against C for the amount of the original claim.'
" It would seem reasonable to believe that the real basis for the trial judge's
action may be better ascertained from what he said, as set out in the record,
than from the formal judgment, which is usually worded by counsel.
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §2234.
'Yaarab Temple Bldg. Co. v. Carmichael Tile Co., 165 S. E. 319 (Ga.
1932).
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This situation raises the question whether payment to the original
creditor by C's surety discharges C's obligation to the plaintiff in
garnishment. The principal case seems to be the first in which the
situation has come directly before the courts. It will aid in the solu-
tion of this problem to find out whether the surety could also have
been served as garnishee.2
Garnishment is a statutory proceeding to reach the property of a
defendant in the hands of another. It was not known at common
law.8 Therefore, the nature of both the remedy and its enforcement
will vary according to the statutes of the different states. However,
statutes are fairly uniform in subjecting to garnishment: (1) those
who hold tangible property of defendant; (2) those who are in-
debted to defendant.4 A surety to be held as garnishee must come
in this latter class. .
The courts are not uniform in their construction of the word
"indebted" within the terms of these statutes. When faced with a
situation that demands only a general rule, they usually say that if
a cause of action would lie by defendant against the garnishee, he
may be garnished ;5 but when the necessity for exact application of
this rule arises, they restrict it to causes of action that would support
the common-law action of indebitatus assumpsit.6 This virtually re-
2 This question also seems never to have been decided. The legislature
could extend garnishment to sureties specifically. 28 C. J. 43, §45. However,
no statutes seem to have done this.
See 28 C. J. 16, §2, for a discussion of the origin.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§816, 817, 819; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1930) §6383; MAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 246, §20; Arab. DiG. STAT. (Craw-
ford & Moses, 1921) §503; ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1921) §4264; ALA.
CODE (Michie, 1928) §8051 et seq.; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) §5272.
'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Inman, 157 Miss. 810, 126 So. 399 (1930) (no debt
existed between the defendant and garnishee) ; Patton v. Smith, 29 N. C. 438
(1847) (creditor had collected money before garnishment) ; Bank v. O'Barr,
12 Ala. App. 546, 67 So. 794 (1914) (debtor had assigned claim). But cf.
Corey v. Powers, 18 Vt. 587 (1846). See also Bonds Bros. v. Anniston City
Nat'l Bank, 198 Ala. 197, 73 So. 467 (1916), and Walcott v. Richman, 94 Me.
364, 47 Atl. 901 (1900), which seem to place the test of liability on the exist-
ence of a contract action.
' Beach Co. v. Brewers, 101 Cal. 322, 35 Pac. 896 (1894) ; Foere v. Miss.
Transp. Co., 161 Ala. 567, 49 So. 87 (1909) ; Hassie v. God Be With Us Con-
gregation, 35 Cal. 378 (1868); DRAY.x ArrAcHMENT (1854) 526; PEu, MON-
OGRAPHS ON N. C. LAw (1918) 101.
Two cases in North Carolina illustrate and explain to some extent the
reasons for the lack of clarity in stating the test. In Hugg v. Booth, 24 N. C.
282 (1842), the plaintiff was attempting to garnish a claim arising out of
breach of contract. The court, refusing to allow the garnishment, clearly
states that there must be a cause that will support indebitatues assumpsit. But
in Patton v. Smith, supra note 5, the debtor had already paid the claim. The
court merely said that there must be a cause of action between defendant and
debtor to support garnishment.
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stricts the construction of the word "indebted" to the relationship
of debtor-creditor.7
Assuming that the courts will continue to apply the indebitatus
assumpsit rule, a surety could not be garnished.8 The contract of
suretyship is a collateral contract, without sufficient consideration
moving from creditor to surety to support indebitatus assumpsitO
This test of liability to garnishment is entirely inadequate. Aside
from being highly technical, it is based upon' a procedural form that
is foreign to modern law. It does not give garnishment the compre-
hensive scope that modern commercial litigation demands. Through
present-day business transactions a defendant may have substantial
assets in the hands of, or claims against, third persons when the rela-
tion of debtor-creditor does not exist. These should be available to
his creditors through garnishment.
Then if a surety could not be garnished, will the debtor be dis-
charged from liability to the plaintiff in garnishment by the surety's
paying the creditor after the debtor is garnished? The instant case
says that he will not. The debtor was liable to creditor at the time of
garnishment. After garnishment he is liable to plaintiff in garnish-
ment, and payment to the creditor could not discharge this liability.
Following this reasoning it would seem that the liability of a
general surety would also be transferred to the plaintiff in garnish-
ment. And though a special surety contract could not, because of
its very nature, be so transferred, it is difficult to see how the courts
would enforce such a contract between the creditor and surety after
the debtor has been garnished. Therefore, a surety should -not be
allowed to pay when he knows the debtor has been garnished, and in
this way acquire a right of action against the debtor.
It would seem that the best solution to the problem is to allow the
surety to be garnished. This would preclude the surety's paying
"The test for fliability in garnishment is sometimes placed on this basis.
Cooper v. Burgess, 152 Mass. 189, 25 N. E. 100 (1890).I Keigwin states that indebitatus assunpsit will not lie when it is necessary
to show an "undertaking collateral to the transaction." "Such are cases of
wagers, warranties, policies of insurance, contracts of guaranty and surety-
ship, and all contracts still executory and contemplating things to be done in
the future." KEIGWIN, CASES ON COMMON LAW PLEADING (1924) 193. Tap-
pen v. Campbell, 9 Yerg. 436 (Tenn. 1836), holds specifically that only special
assumpsit, and not indebitatuNs assunipsit, will lie on a contract of guaranty. "
' "... In a contract of guaranty .. .the defendant's obligation is to pay
money, but the plaintiff cannot recover in general assumpsit on the contract
because the money to be paid by the defendant is not to pay compensation for
benefits received." CLARK, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1931) 106.
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creditors, and would thus eliminate any question of the surety's li-
ability, and any possibility of the debtor's having to pay twice. In
fairness to the plaintiff in garnishment, the duty should be placed on
the surety, when he knows of the garnishment of the debtor, to dis-
close his existence in order that he, also, may be garnished.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.
Insurance-Interests of Assignee and Beneficiary When Life
Policy Is Assigned Without Change of Beneficiary.
A husband as principal and his wife as surety execute a bond,
and a deed of trust to secure it, for a loan to the husband from an
insurance company. Then, pursuant to an agreement with the com-
pany, the husband takes out two policies of life insurance, in both of
which he names his wife as beneficiary and reserves the right to
change the beneficiary and assign the policy, and as a part of the
transaction, they both assign the policies as additional security for
the bond. Held: Upon the death of the insured, the entire proceeds
became the property of the beneficiary, subject only to the rights of
the assignee, and when the insurance company has paid the bond out
of that property of the surety with her consent, she is subrogated to
the rights of the insurance company and has a claim against the estate
of the insured for the amount thus paid.'
In a contest between an assignee and a beneficiary where, as in
the principal case, by the terms of the policy there is both a right to
change the beneficiary and to assign the policy, it is generally held that
an assignment pursuant to such power defeats the interest of the
beneficiary to the extent of the assignment, even though the benefi-
ciary does not join therein.2 And where there is no right reserved
in the policy to assign, if there is a right to change the beneficiary,
most courts say that the beneficiary has a mere expectancy 3 and not
a vested interest and that an assignment by the insured shuts out the
'Russell v. Owen et al., 203 N. C. 262, 165 S. E. 687 (1932).
'Farmer's-State Bank v. Kelly, 155 Ga. 733, 118 S. E. 197 (1923) ; Mer-
chant's Bank v. Garrard, 158 Ga. 867, 124 S. E. 715 (1924); Antley v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 139 S. C. 23, 137 S, E. 199 (1927) ; Hawkes v. Mobley, 174 Ga.
481, 163 S. E. 494 (1932).
"Andrew v. Banker's Life Co., 240 N. W. 215. (Iowa 1932) ; Williams v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 Miss. 408, 133 So. 799 (1931) ; Wilkerson v.
Gallahar, 129 So. 799 (Ala. 1930); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 81
Cal. App. 546, 254 Pac. 306 (1927); Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222
Fed. 200 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) (federal rule). Insured's control over policy is
said to be as complete as if he himself had been beneficiary.
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beneficiary pro tanto regardless of the latter's consent.4 On the other
hand, some courts say the beneficiary has a vested interest,5 and
under such a holding, it becomes material whether the beneficiary has
consented to the assignment, for without such consent the benefi-
ciary's interest would not pass to the assignee but would remain
superior.6 However, a number of courts give effect to the intent of
the insured and say that even though the interest of the beneficiary
be vested, the insured's assignment of his "right, title, and interest
and all beneficial advantage" effects a change of beneficiary without
the beneficiary's consent.7
Then where the insurance company is assignee and the policy
provides for a change of beneficiary and for a loan, courts hold that
the assignee takes an interest superior to that of beneficiary, although
the beneficiary has not consented to the assignment, and regardless
of whether the beneficiary's interest is considered a mere expectancy
or vested.8 Even where the policy has no such stipulation, the result
should be the same, since here the loan by the company may be re-
garded as merely an advance on the policy which does not create any
personal liability on the part of the insured.9
In the principal case, it is apparent that the assignee has taken
an interest superior to that of the beneficiary and would take such
an interest regardless of the consent of the beneficiary. The question
"Elmore v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 131 Kan. 335, 291 Pac. 755 (1930) ;Antrim v. Internat'l. Life Ins. Co., 128 Kan. 65, 275 Pac. 1084 (1929) ; Bank of
Belzoni v. Hodges, 132 Miss 238, 96 So. 97 (1923).
'Barron v. Liberty Nat'l. B'k. of S. C., 131 S. C. 441, 128 S. E. 414 (1925);
Anderson v. Broad St. Nat'l. B'k., 90 N. J. Eq. 78, 105 Atl. 599 (1918) (insured
was said to have only a contingent right if he outlived beneficiary). Tyler v.
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 226 Mass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917) ; Deal v. Deal,
87 S. C. 395, 69 S. E. 886 (1911).6 Schoenholz v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 24, 136 N. E. 227 (1922) (in-
sured's assignee was said to get only insured's interest) ; City Nat'l. Bank of
Lawton v. Lewis, 73 Okla. 329, 176 Pac. 237 (1918); Anderson v. Broad St.
Nat'l. Bank, supra note 5; Muller v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 Colo. 245,
161 Pac. 148 (1916) ; Sullivan v. Maroney, 77 N. J. Eq. 565, 78 Atl. 150 (1910).
'Merchant's Bank v. Garrard, supra note 2.8 Salridge v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 195 Iowa 156, 191 N. W. 862(1923); Wagner v. Thieriot, 197 N. Y. Supp. 560 (1922) ; Faris v. Faris, 76
Ind. App. 336, 130 N. E. 444 (1921); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 11
Ind. App. 335, 37 N. E. 180 (1894): The beneficiary is said to receive no more
than the insured has contracted for in her behalf; she acquires the title bur-dened with all its conditions and by accepting the policy, she accepts the condi-
tions and can't afterwards be heard to deny the company's rights.
' Stevens v. First Nat'l. Bank of Muskogee, 117 Okl. 148, 245 Pac. 567(1925) ; Rawls v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Phila., 253 Fed. 725 (C. C. A.
5th, 1918) ; Orleans Parish v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 216 U. S. 517, 30 Sup. Ct.
385, 54 L. ed. 597 (1910) ; Wagner v. Thieriot, supra note 8.
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then arises as to whether the beneficiary can recover from the estate
of the insured on the ground that the proceeds to which the benefi-
ciary was entitled have gone to pay the insured's debt. Where the
beneficiary's interest is a mere expectancy, although he has consented
to the assignment, it is held that such consent is not a transfer of his
property in payment of insured's debt. The conclusion rests on the
ground that the beneficiary has nothing to assign' 0 and also, that
the assignment is a pro tanto change of beneficiary." In other cases
however, where the beneficiary's interest is considered vested and
defeasible and he consents to the assignment, he is permitted to re-
cover from the estate.12 But this is not so, even though the interest
of the beneficiary be vested, where the assignee is the insurance
company, since here the loan is in a strict sense only an advance on
the policy and doesn't create a debt.' 3
The result reached in the principal case seems erroneous.' 4 Since
the assignment passed an interest superior to that of beneficiary and
would have done so even if the beneficiary had not entered into the
assignment, it cannot be said that the beneficiary, by consenting,
passed anything to the assignee on behalf of the insured-assignor.
The point made by the court, that on insured's death the beneficiary's
interest vested, makes no difference. Her interest vested only in what
remained to the insured, which was the difference between the entire
value of the policy and the loan. Furthermore, the intent of the in-
sured should be given effect. 15 The policies were taken solely for
the purpose of securing the loan. Insured's designation of his wife
as beneficiary was intended as a- gift and it probably never occurred
to him that he was creating a liability against himself or his estate.
CECILE L. PILTz.
"Rattray v. Banks, 31 Ga. App. 589, 121 S. E. 516 (1924) ; Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, supra note 3.
Baldwin v. Wheat, 170 Ga. 449, 153 S. E. 194 (1930) ; Rattray v. Banks,
supra note 10.
" Barbin v. Moore, 159 Atl. 409 (N. H. 1932) ; Douglas v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922).
Wagner v. Thieriot, supra note 8.
Farracy v. Perry, 12 S. W. (2d) 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). In this case,
where, as in the principal case, the beneficiary who was said to have a mere
expectancy, consented to the assignment of the policy as additional security, the
result reached is in accord with the principal case. But the case is distinguish-
able on the ground that the assignee was not the insurer, and the policy neither
reserved the right to assign nor was it taken for the sole purpose of securing
the loan.
"Walker v. Penick's Ex'r., 122 Va, 664, 95 S. E. 428 (1918) ; Merchant's
Bank v. Garrard, supra note 2; Herring v. Sutton, 129 N. C. 107, 39 S. E. 772
(1901) (the dissenting opinion).
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Mortgages-Enjoining Foreclosure Sale on Ground of General
Business Depression.
Plaintiff mortgagor filed a bill seeking to have restrained a sale
of land under a deed of trust. He alleged, as grounds for the in-
junction, that there existed "a condition of depression throughout
the entire country in finance and real estate, and business conditions
generally were unprecedently bad; that on account of the scarcity of
money and poor market conditions, it was impossible to obtain the
fair market value of lands at a judicial foreclosure or other forced
or involuntary sale." It was also stated that "delay for a reasonable
time . . . will do defendant no damage, for the reason that the loan
is more than adequately secured; that there are many indications
that in a short time business will have improved ...and property
can be sold even at a forced sale at approximately its market value."
An order refusing the injunction, for lack of any ground for
equitable interference, was affirmed.'
The holding is supported by practically every case that has con-
sidered pleas of general "hard times" 2 scarcity of money,3 or un-
propitious market 4 as grounds for injunctive relief. 5 Reluctance to
speculate on future property values,0 regard for rights of the mort-
gagee, and deference to precedents requiring some showing of mis-
take, fraud or oppression are possible bases for the rule.7 There
probably exists also an unexpressed fear on the part of the court
that a contrary result would endanger future extension of credit on
mortgage security.
1Bolich v. Prudential Insurance Co., 202 N. C. 789, 164 S. E. 335 (1932).
See also Darien Bank v. Varner, 165 S. E. 82 (Ga. 1932).
'Thomas v. San Diego College Co., 111 Cal. 358, 43 Pac. 965 (1896);
McGown v. Sandford, 9 Paige 290 (N. Y. 1841); Commonwealth Bank v.
McDonell, 49 S. W. (2d) 525 (Tex. 1932); Muller's Adm'r. v. Stone, 84 Va.
834, 6 S. E. 223 (1888); WITSIE, MORTGAGE Foamosum (4th ed. 1927)
§663; JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §2354; 41 C. J. 930, §1353. See
Nebraska Loan Co. v. Hamer, 40 Neb. 281, 58 N. W. 695, 697 (1894).
In McGown v. Sandford, "unsettled politics" in anticipation of an extra
session of Congress was alleged as an additional ground for postponement.
The case is weakened by the fact that sale had already been deferred for six
months on the same grounds.
'Muller v. Bayly, 21 Gratt. 521 (Va. 1871); Caperton v. Landcraft, 3
W. Va. 540 (1869) ; JONES, loc. cit. supra note 2; 41 C. J. 930, §1353. But see(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 87.
'Floore v. Morgan, 175 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Muller v.
Bayly, supra note 3.
"In Anderson v. White, 2 App. D. C. 408 (1894), the court disallowed all
three as grounds for setting aside the sale.
' See Lipscomb v. Life Insurance Co., 130 Mo. 17, 39 S. W. 465, 466 (1897).(1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 87, commenting on the principal case.
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The opinion seems to hint,8 however, that perhaps a specific
allegation of unusually adverse conditions existing at the particular
locality of the sale would have had more weight with the court9
than did the general language used in the complaint. Such an atti-
tude would be in accord with the practice of many corporate mort-
gagees, and of some trial courts, of avoiding useless sacrifice of the
property so long as taxes and interest are paid by the mortgagor.
Upon a motion to set aside a sale due to inadequacy of price,
plaintiff would have the advantage of definite proof as to the de-
pression's effect on property values in this community in general
and in this instance in particular, but the court's hesitancy to inter-
fere with executed transactions and with rights of mortgagees might
still militate against him.10 Most courts agree that mere inadequacy
of price is insufficient ground for setting aside a foreclosure sale,
either before"' or after' 2 confirmation. Contrary, however, to the
dictum of the principal case that "an unconscionable purchase price
has not heretofore been deemed adequate to invoke equitable power,"
a well-recognized exception justifies either refusal to confirm the
sale' 3 or setting it aside' 4 where the price is so grossly dispropor-
8 "Perhaps no court is wise enough to declare with absolute finality that no
economic or financial stringency or distress would warrant the intervention of
equitable principles in restraining the power of sale in instruments securing
debts. . . ." 202 N. C. at 792, 164 S. E. at 336.
See Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346, 402 (N. Y. 1827) ; WiLTsIE, loc. cit.
mspra note 2. But see Palmer v. McCormick, 30 Fed. 82, 85 (1887) ("grass-
hopper plague' held no ground for relief).
The principal case arose in Forsythe, a relatively prosperous county; but
what if it had arisen, for example, in Buncombe?
'" See Anderson v. White, supra note 5, at 418.
' Springer v. Law, 185 Ill. 542, 57 N. E. 435 (1900); 42 C. J. 223, §1861.
" Carlisle v. Dunlap, 203 Mich. 602, 16 N. W. 936 (1918) ; Lipscomb v.
Life Insurance Co., supra note 6; Guarantee Trust Co. v. Fitzgerald Hotel
Corp., 97 N. J. Eq. 277, 127 AtI. 672 (1925) ; State Realty Co. v. Villaume,
121 App. Div. 793, 106 N. Y. Supp. 698 (1907); Monroe Bros. v. Fuchter &
Kern, 121 N. C. 101, 28 S. E. 63 (1897); Watkins v. Justice, 256 Pa. 37,
100 AtI. 488 (1917) ; (1927) 26 MIcH. L. REv. 87; (1929) 27 MicH. L. REv.
822; JONES, op. cit. supre note 2, §§2140, 2462; WILTsiE, op. cit. supra note 2,
§§752, 759; (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1001; see Nebraska Loan Co. v. Hamer, supra
note 2, at 697; Warner v. Jacob, 20 Ch. D. 220, 221 (1882).
' Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U. S. 285, 27 Sup. Ct. 527, 51 L. ed. 803 (1907)
(price 1/7 of value) ; Moeller v. Miller, 315 Ill. 454, 146 N. E. 449 (1925)
(price 1/10 of value); Farmers' Life Insurance Co. v. Stegink, 106 Kan. 730,
189 Pac. 965 (1920) (price 1/3 of value).
Some courts require the mortgagor to show there is no right of redemption.
See Moeller v. Miller, supra.
'AVail v. Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130 (1876) (price 1/6 of value); Hoffman v.
McCracken, 168 Mo. 337, 67 S. W. 878 (1902) (land worth $4,500 sold for
$40 to pay a debt of $4.50) ; see Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755, 82 S. E.
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tionate to value as to shock the court's conscience 15 or imply fraud. 10
Due, however, to the fact that no personal culpability is here in-
volved, this exception is of little value in the present case.
In any event, rules with reference to individual price inad-
equacies, or to individual fraud, mistake and duress have no relation
to a world-wide depression. Are the courts to continue to give to
Shylock his promised pound of flesh, or is there some way in which
the creative powers of courts of equity may be put to work on a pro-
gram of economic coperation with all of the other agencies of so-
ciety that are trying to ameliorate the effects of and to bring an
end to the depression? Happily, the principal case leaves the way
open.
JAMES M. LITTLE, JR.
Mortgages--Mortgage as Security for Obligations Subsequent
to Original Note.
A executed a note secured by a duly recorded deed of trust.
While the obligation was in effect A executed a second note, agreeing
on the face of the same that the first note and mortgage should serve
as collateral for the second note and any other obligation of A to the
mortgagee. It does not appear that this transaction was ever re-
corded. Without notice, B became second mortgagee and his assignee
sought to redeem from the first mortgagee by tendering the un-
paid balance due on the original note secured by the first mort-
gage. Held: A's mortgage was security not only for the note it
originally secured, but for other obligations of A to the mortgagee,
711, 712 (1914). But see Baldwin v. Brown, 193 Cal. 345, 224 Pac. 462, 466
(1924) (price 1/10 of value held insufficient).
A trustee acting by virtue of a power of sale is deemed to be agent of both
-parties, and must use reasonable diligence, even to adjourning the sale from
time to time, to prevent sacrifice of the property. Courts will examine the
transaction closely where a deed of trust allows speedy sale without judicial
supervision upon default. See Anderson v. White, supra note 5, at 416; Clapp
v. Gardner, 237 Mass. 187, 130 N. E. 47, 48 (1921); Rohrer v. Strickland,
supra, at 712; Linney v. Normoyle, 145 Va. 589, 134 S. E. 554 (1926) ; JoNEs,
op. cit. supra note 2, §2451.
Where the price -is inadequate courts often seize upon some minute irreg-
ularity as ground for vacating the sale. See (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 87;
Linney v. Normoyle, supra, at 555.
(1920) 8 A. L. R. 1001; 42 C. J. 235, §1876.
10 See Clark v. Eaton, 100 U. S. 149, 152, 25 L. ed. 573, 574 (1879) ; Ander-
son v. White, supra note 5, at 416; WmTsia, op. cit. supra note 2, §752.
The North Carolina court requires a discrepancy so great as to cause "all
acquainted with the value of the land to say at once 'The purchaser got it for
nothing."' See Monroe Bros. v. Fuchter & Kern, supra note 12, at 105.
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and specifically for a third note on which A was liable to the mort-
gagee.'
Priority of mortgage claims depends upon date of recordation. 2
An unregistered mortgage is a claim second to a subsequent, but
recorded, instrument. 3 In North Carolina rigid interpretation of the
recordation.statute is made.4
Although in various types of mortgage transactions secret equities
are usually enforceable as to the original parties, they are rarely al-
lowed to defeat the rights of innocent third parties.5 For example,
in Continwntal Bank v. Kowalsky,6 A gave a recorded mortgage to
B, later paying a portion of the debt and executing a renewal note
for the unpaid balance which recited that the mortgage should serve
as collateral for past and future obligations of A to B. This trans-
action was not recorded and C, vendee of A, had no actual notice
thereof. B was held estopped to claim more than the unpaid balance
of the note.7 It has also been held that the mortgagee of a vendee
could pass good title to a purchaser irrespective of equities of the
original vendor," and that an innocent purchaser of property is
chargeable only with the recorded amount of an incumbrance, al-
lRabil v. Fagan, 203 N. C. 224, 165 S. E. 691 (1932).
'N. C. CODE Ax1. (Michie, 1931) §3311: "No deed of trust or mortgage
for real or personal estate shall be valid at law to pass any property as against
creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor,
or mortgagor, but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in
the county in which the land lies. .. " This is a fairly representative type of
recordation statute.
'Wood v. Lewey, 153 14. C. 401, 69 S. E. 268 (1910). This rule is subject
to certain minor exceptions not applicable here.
' In Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 148, 19 S. E. 99 (1894), Clark,
J., said: "All secret trusts, latent liens and hidden encumbrances are and were
intended to be cut up by the roots, by force of our registration laws." See
(1931) 9 N. C. L. RLv. 221, and cases cited therein.
' Numerous cases lay down this doctrine, and in so far as the writer has dis-
covered none have denied it. "It is too well settled to admit of serious con-
troversy that the parties to a mortgage originally intended to secure a par-
ticular debt, may later agree in writing that, as to themselves, it shall be
security for the payment of a different debt or future advances" (italics the
writer's). First Nat. Bank of Missoula v. Marlowe, 71 Mont. 461, 230 Pac.
374, 377 (1924).
0 247 Mich. 348, 225 N. W. 496 (1929).
An additional fact in the case supporting the decision, made on an estoppel
basis, -was that B had intentionally misrepresented the extent of A's indebted-
ness under the first mortgage, although there is no intimation in the case that
had this element been lacking the decision would have been contra. The bind-
ing effect of the record upon B was pointed out.
' Broussard v. Broussard, 45 La. Ann. 1085, 13 So. 699 (1893). The same
result was reached in an almost identical situation in Thompson v. Whitbeck,
47 La. Ann. 49. 16 So. 570 (1895).
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though the sum intended was ten times as great.9 Again, in Battle
-v. Jennings Naval Stores Co., 10 A and B gave a mortgage to secure
five notes and other obligations arising out of a separate contract.
New, unrecorded agreements similar to the first and to be secured by
the first mortgage were made from time to time. C, a judgment cred-
itor, was awarded priority over these last contracts since he had no
actual or constructive notice of them. The rights of an innocent
mortgagee would not be less than those of C.
The essential nature of the instant transaction suggests that it
would be correct to designate the addition of another note to the
obligation secured by the mortgage as a second mortgage since the
results obtained (between the parties) were precisely the same as
though a second mortgage had been given.1
But it is submitted that the principal case was improperly decided
whether the transaction be considered as a simple assignment or a
second mortgage: (1) secret equities ought not to be allowed to de-
feat the rights of one who has absolutely no means of ascertaining
the true state of facts from the record, and (2) the decision makes
serious inroads upon the effectiveness of the North Carolina recorda-
tion statute.
WILSON BARBER.
Negotiable Instruments-Negotiability of Notes Detachable
From Contract.
The defendant was induced to sign a contract of purchase and
each of six promissory notes, attached to the contract, but separated
from the main body thereof by perforated lines. Each note matured
on a different date. The contract contained warranties limiting the
maker's liability on the notes. The payee, upon receiving the instru-
ment from his agent, detached the notes and discounted them to the
plaintiff who sues as a holder in due course. Held: The detachment
was a material alteration; maker discharged.'
If the detachment is either expressly or impliedly authorized, the
'Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns, 544, 9 Am. Dec. 246 (N. Y. 1820).
'74 Fla, 12, 75 So. 949 (1917).
"One cannot escape the feeling that if the doctrine laid down in the instant
case be allowed to prevail for long, endless fraud could be practiced on inno-
cent second mortgagees, other encumbrancers and creditors by unscrupulous
mortgagors and first mortgagees. demanding that the security of first mort-
gages be extended to additional obligations. A second mortgagee has no way
of ascertaining what debts the first mortgage secures.
'Whaley Bros. v. Stevens, 165 S. E. 645 (Va. 1932).
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notes when detached are properly held to be valid negotiable notes. 2
This is true even though the contract contains conditions modifying
the liability on the notes, and a holder in due course recovers from
the maker despite defenses good against the payee.3 In the absence
of such authority, however, the whole paper can only be considered
as one non-negotiable contract. 4 Detachment in this case is uniformly
held to be a material alteration which avoids the obligation even in
the hands of a holder in due course. 5 In a few jurisdictions, this
rule is subject to the exception that the holder can recover upon show-
ing that the maker was negligent in executing and delivering the
notes in such form that they might be easily detached and put into
circulation.6
It has 'been suggested that the policy of protecting bona fide
holders evidenced by the Negotiable Instruments Law should result
in protecting a person in the position of the plaintiff who holds a
writing in the form of a negotiable note, as against a defendant
whose conduct made the alteration possible.7 This would require im-
plying authority to detach in every case in which such a note comes
into the hands of a holder in due course, thus going further than the
minority common-law rule which reaches such a result only where the
maker was negligent.
Indeed, where there is no express authority to detach, the nature
of the transactions itself would seem to show almost conclusively
that such authority is implied. It is hard to see how the maker, when
he signed his name six times, to each of six notes maturing on dif-
ferent dates and set off from the main contract by perforated lines,
intended otherwise than that each should be presented to him as a
separate and distinct obligation.
In spite of these considerations, in almost all the cases in which
there were ample grounds for implying authority,8 and even in a
'Harrison v. Hunter, 168 S. W. 1036 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Foster v.
Iowa City State Bank, 201 S. W. 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'Stevens v. Vermillion, 109 Kan. 504, 200 Pac. 277 (1921); Stevens v.
Khetter, 110 S. C. 271, 96 S. E. 406 (1918).
'General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garrard, 41 Idaho 151, 238 Pac. 524(1925); Citizens' Nat. Bank of Abilene v. Campbell, 6 S. W. (2d) 799 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
'Stevens v. Venema, 202 Mich. 232, 168 N. W. 531, L. R. A. 1918F, 1145(1918); Landon v. Holcomb, 184 S. W. 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).8Harrison v. Union Store Co., 179 Ky. 672, 201 S. W. 31 (1918) ; Security
Finance Co. v. Floyd, 294 S. W. 1113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
Note (1926) 26 Co. L. REV. 478.
'Of some ten cases in which'the character of the instrument was such as to
permit finding that authority to detach was implied, only three so held. Con-.
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few cases in which there was an express authorizing clause, by ignor-
ing or explaining away the clause,9 the courts have held the detach-
ment unauthorized and thus a material alteration. This attitude is
explained by the fact that the courts take notice of a long line of
cases which shows that this type of contract is used by only a few
concerns,' 0 that the notes are in frequent litigation, that the element
of fraud in the inception is often introduced, and that the plaintiff is
seldom able to prove himself a holder "without notice."' 1
A few cases have held the detachment to be a material alteration,
and then permitted the plaintiff to recover according to the original
terms of the contract on the basis of Section 124 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law.' 2 The Negotiable Instruments Law, however,
applies only to instruments negotiable in their origin, so Section 124
has no proper application. 18
With this background, it is not surprising that the courts refuse
to create implications to aid the plaintiff, but instead hold that the
queror Trust Co. v. Simnon, 62 Okla. 252, 162 Pac. 1098 (1917); Landon v.
Win. E. Huston Drug Co., 190 S. W. 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Landon v.
Foster Drug Co., 186 S. W. 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). In the first two of
these cases, the makers had paid one of the notes, so that the element of affirm-
ance of the alteration helped bring about the decision. Cases refusing to find
implied authority include: Stevens v. Venema, supra note 5; General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Garrard, supra note 4; Landon v. Halcomb, supra note 5;
Citizens' Nat. Bank of Abilene v. Campbell, srupra note 4; Wichita Farm
Lighting Co. v. Moore, 46 S. W. (2d) 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
' Stevens v. Venema, supra note 5; Stevens v. Barnes, 43 N. D. 483, 175
N. W. 709, 18 A. L. R. 10 (1919) ("Such detachment constitutes a material
alteration of the note * * * even if in the order there are words authorizing
said note to be detached, for they only show more clearly the fraudulent pur-
pose of the combination of the two instruments.") ; Stevens v. Clintwood Drug
Co., 155 Va. 353, 154 S. E. 515 (1930).
" This type of contract seems to be standard with the Brenard Mfg. Co.,
the Donald-Richard Co.,.the Lyon-Taylor Co., and the Puritan Mfg. Co., all
located in Iowa City, Iowa, and with the Vernon Advertising Co. of Schell
City, Mo., and the Partin Mfg. Co. of Memphis, Tenn. All but a few of the
cases involving instruments of this nature were based on notes of which one
of these companies was payee. The notes of each concern have been in fre-
quent litigation with the defense of fraud almost always appearing.
IStevens v. Venema, supra note 5; Stevens v. Pearson, 138 Minn. 72, 163
N. W. 769 (1917); Stevens v. Barnes, suprcr note 9; Stevens v. Clintwood
Drug Co., mspra note 9; Landon v. Halcomb, mspra note 5. It is noticeable
how often the same party has sued on notes of this type over a period of years
as a holder "without notice." Stevens, Harrison, Iowa City State Bank, and
the Security Finance Co. have appeared in some twenty cases which reached
the appellate courts, as holders "without notice" of the notes payable to the
various Iowa City concerns.
"Stevens v. Wheeler, 3 S. W. (2d) 122 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Garrard, supra note 4; Citizens' Nat.
Bank of Abilene v. Campbell, supra note 4.
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obligation is void. The plaintiff, should he be a bona fide holder,
still has his action against the payee.
IRVIN E. ERB.
Trusts-Right of Residuary Legatee on Failure of
Charitable Trust.
Testatrix bequeathed certain personal property- to the trustees of
an orphanage to be held in trust for the education through high
school of selected girl inmates. The residuary legatee brings suit
five years later, claiming that the trust has failed, and that the prop-
erty reverts to him, because the state provides free education for
orphans. Held: The trust has not failed, and plaintiff has no cause
of action against the trustees, though there has been a misapplication
of the trust funds.'
The decision in the instant case that the trust has not failed seems
correct. Only a six months school term is supported by the state,2
and the statute extending the public school facilities to inmates of
orphan homes is permissive only.3 Furthermore, the trust funds
may be used for the purchasing of books,4 or of clothes. 5 In the
early days of the country there were many trusts established for the
purpose of affording free public schools for the poor. 6 Many of
these trusts have been held not to have failed after the establishment
of free schools by the state, for the funds could be used for various
incidental expenses of education. 7 Indeed, some courts hold that the
proceeds of the trust may be paid directly to the public school fund,
in which case the only effect is a reduction in taxes, falling alike
upon the rich and the poor.8
" Humphrey v. Board of Trustees of 1. 0. 0. F. Home of Goldsboro, 203
N. C. 201, 165 S. E. 547 (1932).
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §5383.
3 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §5446.
' Birchard v. Scott, 39 Conn. 63 (1872) ; Crow v. Clay County, 196 Mo.
234, 95 S. W. 369 (1906) ; Bolick v. Cox, 145 Ga. 888, 90 S. E. 54 (1916).
Tincher v. Arnold, 147 Fed. 665 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906) ; McIntire's Adm'rs.
v. City of Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352 (1867).
' Griffin v. Graham, 8 N. C. 96, 9 Am. Dec. 619 (1820) ; Barr v. Weld, 24
Pa. 84 (1854) ; Green v. Blackwell, 35 Atl. 375 (N. J. Ch. 1896) ; In re John's
Will, 30 Ore. 494, 47 Pac. 341 (1896).
"Tincher v. Arnold, McIntire's Adm'rs. v. City of Zanesville, both supra
note 5; Birchard v. Scott, Bolick v. Cox, both supra note 4; Green v. Black-
well, In re John's Will, both supra note 6; Elliott v. Quinn, 109 Neb. 5, 189
N. W. 173 (1922).
8Adams Female Academy v. Adams, 65 N. H. 225, 18 At. 777 (1889)
Crow v. Clay County, supra note 4. Contra: McIntire's Adm'rs. v. City of
Zanesville, supra note 5.
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Most states have adopted in the law of charities what is known
as the cy pres doctrine.9 That is to say, when a charitable trust has
become impossible of execution as specified, the courts, rather than
decree a failure of the gift, will, if a -general charitable intent ap-
pears, direct the application of the property to other charitable pur-
poses. 10 Therefore, in these jurisdictions, cases very rarely arise
where a charitable trust can be held to have failed, with a consequent
devolution to a residuary legatee or the donor's heirs. 1 Indeed, this
situation has led several courts to say that when property is given
for charitable purposes, with no provision for reverter, neither the
donor nor his heirs nor the residuary legatee can ever have the prop-
erty back.12 On the other hand, in the few states that do not accept
the cy pres doctrine, the failure of charitable trusts occurs more
often. 3 North Carolina, though it maintains a liberal attitude to-
ward charitable trusts, 14 falls within this group. Thus, where some
obstruction has arisen to make it impossible to carry out the ex-
pressed purpose of the testator,' 5 or the trust is for an illegal pur-
pose,16 the court has no alternative but to decree a failure of the
trust and an intestate succession by the donor's heirs or personal
representative, or a passage under the will to the residuary legatee,
if there be one.
As a general rule, in the absence of an express provision for
reverter, though the trustees abuse the trust, misemploy the funds,
or commit a breach of the trust, the only remedy is an action to en-
9 BoGERT, TRUSTS (1921) §63; Note (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 41.
City of Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs, 45 Pa. 9, 84 Am. Dec. 470 (1863);
Keene v. Eastman, 75 N. H. 191, 72 Atl. 213 (1909) ; Bruce v. Maxwell, 311
Ill. 479, 143 N. E. 82 (1924); BoGERT, loc. cit. supra note 9; Note (1925) 35YAL L. J. 643.
"Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867); Ely v. Atty. Gen., 202 Mass.
545, 89 N. E. 166 (1909) ; BoGERT, loc. cit. supra note 9.
, White v. Keller, 68 Fed. 796 (C. C. A. 5th, 1895) ; Academy of the Vis-
itation v. St. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167 (1872); Richards v. Wilson, 185 Ind. 335,
112 N. E. 780 (1916).
"McCauley v. Wilson, 16 N. C. 276, 18 Am. Dec. 587 (1828) ; Universalist
Convention of Ala. v. May, 147 Ala. 455, 41 So. 515 (1906) ; Taylor v. Rogers,
130 Ky. 112, 112 S. W. 1105 (1908) ; Golding v. Gaither, 113 Md. 187, 77 Atl.
333 (1910) ; Grundy v. Neal, 147 Ky. 729, 145 S. W. 401 (1912) ; Mars v. Gil-
bert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1913).
"Note (1922) 1 N. C. L. Rav. 41. North Carolina has provided by statute
that no gift for charitable uses shall be invalid by reason of any indefiniteness
or uncertainty of the object or beneficiaries of such trust. N. C. CODE ANM.
(Michie, 1931) §4035.
" McCauley v. Wilson, supra note 13; Trustees of Davidson College v.
Chambers, 56 N. C. 253 (1857).
"Lemmond v. Peoples, 41 N. C. 137 (1848).
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force the trustwX7 Usually, such an action must be brought by the
attorney-general.1 8 North Carolina has provided by statute that an
action to enforce a charitable trust must be brought by the attorney-
general or county solicitor in the name of the state.19 This statute,
however, must not be construed as meaning that the heir or residuary
legatee can never sue to recover trust property. If the trust has
actually and completely failed, he might well have a good cause of
action, for the statute would not apply.20 In State v. Gerard2l the
Court stated the function of this statute, saying: "The Statute of
Elizabeth was avowedly passed to redress the misemployment of
lands, goods, and stocks of money, theretofore given to certain char-
itable uses, though the mode of redress directed was by its enact-
ments made to apply to subsequent dispositions for such uses. This
statute was in force in this State, and so remained, until it was
superseded by our act concerning charities, which was passed ex-
pressly for the same purpose, viz., to secure the faithful management
of all property, real or personal, which had been or thereafter should
be granted by deed, will or otherwise for such charitable purposes as
were allowed by law." From this, it is evident that the statute has
no application to cases where the trust purpose cannot be effectuated.
Consequently, the holding in the principal case that the residuary
legatee has no right to sue is confined to the particular facts of that
case. It would be manifestly unjust not to allow the heir or resid-
uary legatee to sue for the recovery of property which, upon failure
of the trust, should become his by operation of law.
ROBERT A. Hovis.
"Brown v. Meeting St. Baptist Church, 9 R. I. 177 (1869) ; In re Sellers
Chapel Meth. Church, 139 Pa. 61, 21 Atl. 145, 11 L. R. A. 282 (1891) ; Alumni
Assoc. v. Gen. Theological Seminary, 163 N. Y. 417, 57 N. E. 626 (1900);
Stewart v. Franchetti, 153 N. Y. Supp. 453 (1915) ; Northwestern University
v. Wesley Memorial Hospital, 290 Ill. 205, 125 N. E. 13 (1919); 2 PERRY,
TRuSTS (6th ed. 1911) §744.
" See Note (1928) 62 A. L. R. 881 and cases there cited. "Heirs and per-
sonal representatives of a donor have no beneficial interest reverting or accru-
ing to themselves from the breach or non-execution of a trust for a charitable
use," 2 PmuY, loc. cit. supra note 17. But see McGee v. Vandeventer, 326 Ill.
425, 158 N. E. 127, 133 (1927) and Note (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 533, indicating
that the donor's heir might have a right to sue to prevent diversion of the
trust funds.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4034. The action may be brought at
the suggestion of the clerk of the superior court, with whom the trustees must
file accounts, or upon request of two reputable citizens. See N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §4033.
o Cases cited, supra notes 15 and 16.
"37 N. C. 210, at 220 (1842).
